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Abstract. Existence, uniqueness, and approximations of smooth solutions to team optimization
problems with stochastic information structure are investigated. Suboptimal strategies made up of
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1. Introduction. Team theory investigates the way in which a group of de-
cision makers (DMs), each having at disposal some information (obtained, e.g., by
measurement devices or exit polls) and various possibilities of decisions, coordinate
their efforts to achieve a common goal, expressed via a team utility function. Decisions
are generated by the DMs via strategies, on the basis of the information available to
each of them and in the presence of uncertainties in the external world, which the
DMs do not control.
In general one centralized DM, which maximizes a common goal relying on the
whole available information, provides a better performance than a group of decen-
tralized DMs, each one with partial information. However, often centralization is not
feasible. For example, the DMs may have access to local information that cannot be
exchanged instantaneously, or the cost of making the whole information available to
a unique DM may be unacceptably high.
Teams cooperating to achieve a common goal model a variety of problems in
economic systems, management science, and operations research. Team organiza-
tions abound in science, engineering, and everyday life: examples are communication
and computer networks in geographical areas, production plants, energy distribution
systems, traffic systems in large metropolitan regions, and freeway systems. For in-
stance, a situation with a natural team formulation is represented by routing in packet-
switching telecommunication networks. In this context, the DMs are the routers at
the nodes and they choose their decisions on the basis of the respective routing strate-
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gies. The DMs do not possess common information on the state of the network (the
state may be represented, e.g., by the lengths of the packet queues at the nodes and
the delays in the links): each of them has a “personal” information but they share the
common goal of minimizing the total time spent by the messages at the nodes and in
the communication links.
In the team optimization problems that we address in this paper, the information
of each DM depends on a random variable, called state of the world, and is independent
of the decisions of the other DMs. These are called static teams (first investigated by
Marschak and Radner [33, 34, 44]), in contrast to dynamic teams [4], where each DM’s
information can be affected by previous decisions of other DMs. Many dynamic team
optimization problems can be reformulated in terms of equivalent static ones [53].
Unfortunately, closed-form solutions to team optimization problems can be de-
rived only under quite strong assumptions on the team utility function, on the way
in which each DM’s information depends on the state of the world, and, for dynamic
teams, on the decisions previously taken by the other DMs. Typically, closed-form
solutions can be derived under the so-called LQG hypotheses [44] (i.e., linear informa-
tion structure, concave quadratic team utility, and Gaussian random variables) and,
in the dynamic case, under the hypothesis of partially nested information [20] (i.e.,
each DM can reconstruct the whole information known to the DMs that affects its own
information). However, often these assumptions are too simplified or unrealistic; for
example, this is the case when modeling a price as a Gaussian random variable [19],
which takes negative values with nonzero probability.
In general, even in situations where optimal centralized strategies can be derived,
computing the optimal decentralized ones may be an intractable problem [40, 52].
Thus, typically one has to search for suboptimal solutions. Toward this end, a fruitful
approach consists in searching for them among linear combinations of a certain number
of “basis elements,” corresponding to computational units with a simple structure
(e.g., Gaussians or sines) containing some parameters to be optimized (e.g., centers
and widths in Gaussians or frequencies and phases in sines) [58]. In doing this, it is
important to choose the kind of computational units in order to avoid the so-called
curse of dimensionality [7], i.e., an unmanageably fast (e.g., exponential) growth, with
respect to the dimension of each DM’s information vector, of the minimum number of
basis functions required to guarantee a desired accuracy of the suboptimal strategies.
In the presence of large information vectors, the curse of dimensionality implies that
a very large number of parameters has to be optimized in the computational units.
Often, this makes the search for suboptimal solutions too computationally demanding.
In this paper, we consider static team optimization problems in which the infor-
mation available to each DM is expressed via a probability density function. This is
called a stochastic information structure [3], in contrast to the deterministic informa-
tion structure, where the information that each DM has at its disposal is uniquely
determined by the state of the world. The objectives of our work are the following:
(i) deriving smoothness properties of the (unknown) optimal strategies, (ii) exploiting
such properties to search for suboptimal strategies, in such a way to avoid the curse of
dimensionality, and (iii) estimating their accuracies. Concerning (i), in [17] we inves-
tigated existence and Lipschitz continuity of the optimal strategies, whereas here we
consider a higher degree of smoothness. Moreover, in [17] we did not address issues
(ii) and (iii). A related work is [16], where we proved smoothness properties of the
solutions and investigated suboptimal strategies for centralized T -stage deterministic
optimization problems.
214 G. GNECCO, M. SANGUINETI, AND M. GAGGERO
For static team optimization problems, we first derive conditions guaranteeing
existence, uniqueness, and certain smoothness properties of the solutions. Then, we
search for suboptimal strategies taking on the form of variable-basis approximation
schemes [22, 27, 30], i.e., linear combinations of at most k elements from a set of basis
functions that depend on some inner parameters, where k is large enough to provide
accurate suboptimal solutions. The coefficients in the linear combinations and the
parameters inside the basis functions can be optimized via nonlinear programming
algorithms (see, e.g., [9]). Then, we investigate the accuracy of the suboptimal so-
lutions by estimating the difference between the value of the team, i.e., the expected
value of the team utility function when optimal strategies are used, and its expected
value when the strategies are restricted to certain families of variable-basis functions
with k elements in their expansions. For bases formed by sines with variable fre-
quencies and phases, sigmoidals, and Gaussians with variable centers and widths, we
derive estimates proportional to k−1/2. Hence, for a desired accuracy ε, the minimum
number of basis functions grows at most quadratically with 1/ε, thus avoiding the
curse of dimensionality. To the best of our knowledge, no theoretical estimates of
the accuracy of suboptimal strategies having the form of variable-basis functions were
previously derived for static team optimization problems. Finally, as an application
of our results, we consider a problem of optimal production in a multidivisional firm,
for which we present numerical simulations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces definitions and assump-
tions, formulates the family of team optimization problems that we address, and
describes an instance of such problems, namely, optimal production in a multidivi-
sional firm. Section 3 investigates existence and uniqueness of smooth optimal strate-
gies. Section 4 estimates the accuracies of suboptimal strategies that can be obtained
via variable-basis schemes. Section 5 applies the results to the optimal production
problem described in section 2, for which numerical results are provided. Section 6
discusses other applications and consequences of our results and investigates possible
extensions. All the proofs are detailed in section 7.
2. Problem formulation. The context in which we formalize the team opti-
mization problem and derive our results is the following:
• Static team of n DMs, i = 1, . . . , n.
• x ∈ X ⊆ Rd0 : random variable, called state of the world. The vector x
models the uncertainties in the “external world,” which are not controlled by
the DMs.
• yi ∈ Yi ⊆ Rdi : random variable representing the information that the DM i
has about x.
• si : Yi → Ai ⊆ Rli : strategy of the DM i.
• ai = si(yi) ∈ Ai: decision that the DM i takes on the basis of the information
yi.




i=1 Ai ⊆ RN → R, where N  d0 +
∑n
i=1(di + li): team
utility function.
The DMs’ information on the state of the world x is modeled by an n-tuple of
(possibly dependent) random variables y1 ∈ Y1, . . . , yn ∈ Yn. This is called a stochastic
information structure [3], with a probability density function ρ(x, y1, . . . , yn) on the
set X ×
∏n
i=1 Yi. Our model is a static team, as the joint probability density function
depends only on the state of the world and the information y1, . . . , yn. When the
decision of some DM can affect the information of other DMs, the team is called
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dynamic. As noted in the introduction, many dynamic team optimization problems
can be reformulated in terms of equivalent static ones.
We state the following problem, for which we suppose that the set of optimal
strategies is nonempty; in the next section, we shall give conditions guaranteeing this.
By M(Yi, Ai) we denote the set of bounded and measurable functions from Yi to Ai.
Problem TO (team optimization). Given the joint probability density func-
tion ρ(x, y1, . . . , yn) and the team utility function u(x, {yi}ni=1, {ai}ni=1), find n strate-
gies s◦1, . . . , s◦n such that













The quantity v(s◦1, . . . , s
◦
n) is called value of the team.
We adopt the following notation and definitions. The symbol C is used for the
space of continuous functions, endowed with the supremum norm. For a positive
integer m, by Cm we denote the space of functions that are continuous together with
their partial derivatives up to the order m. For Ω ⊆ Rd, a function f : Ω → Rs is
Lipschitz continuous on Ω with constant L iff there exists L > 0 such that for every
z, w ∈ Ω one has ‖f(z)− f(w)‖ ≤ L ‖z−w‖. For a convex set Ω ⊆ Rd and a concave
function f : Ω → R, a vector αz ∈ Rd is a supergradient of f at z ∈ Ω iff for every
w ∈ Ω one has f(w)−f(z) ≤ αz ·(w−z). For τ > 0, a concave function f defined on a
convex set Ω ⊆ Rd is strongly concave with constant τ iff for every z, w ∈ Ω and every
supergradient αz of f at z one has f(w)− f(z) ≤ αz · (w − z)− τ‖w − z‖2 [36]. It is
separately strongly concave with constant τ iff each function obtained by fixing each
time all variables but one is strongly concave with constant τ . The strong concavity
with constant τ is equivalent to the concavity of the function f(·)+ τ‖ · ‖2. If f ∈ C2,




where λmax(∇2f(z)) is the maximum eigenvalue of the Hessian ∇2f(z).
Assumption A1. The set X of the states of the world is compact, the sets
Y1, . . . , Yn and A1, . . . , An are compact, convex, and with nonempty interiors. For





i=1Ai and ρ is a strictly positive probability density
function on X×
∏n
i=1 Yi, which can be extended to a strictly positive function of class
Cm on an open set containing X ×
∏n
i=1 Yi.
Assumption A2. There exists τ > 0 such that the team utility function is sepa-
rately strongly concave with constant τ .
According to Assumption A2, if one fixes all the arguments of the team utility
function u except the decision variable ai, then the resulting function of ai is strongly
concave with constant τ . For example, in economic problems this is motivated by the
law of diminishing returns, i.e., the fact that typically the marginal productivity of
an input diminishes if the amount of the output increases [34, pp. 99, 110].
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Assumption A3. For every n-tuple {s1, . . . , sn} of strategies and every y1 ∈
Y1, . . . , yn ∈ Yn, the sets
argmax
a1∈A1




Ex,y1,...,yn−1 |yn{u(x, {yi}ni=1, {si(yi)}n−1i=1 , an)}
have nonempty intersections with the interiors of A1, . . . , An, respectively.
Assumption A3 guarantees for each DM the existence of an interior “person-by-
person” optimal strategy, i.e., an optimal strategy when the strategies of all the other
DMs are fixed.
Nontrivial instances of Problem TO for which Assumptions A1–A3 hold can be
constructed in the following way. One takes as a departure point an instance of
Problem TO in which there is no interaction among the DMs, i.e., whose utility
function is of the form u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) =
∑n
i=1 ui(x, y1, . . . , yn, ai), so that
the assumptions are easy to impose (e.g., by choosing functions ui that are quadratic,
strictly concave, and suitably penalized on the boundaries of the sets Ai). Then, one
adds a “sufficiently small” interaction term β uint(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an), where uint
is of class Cm and β > 0 is “sufficiently small,” too, so that Assumptions A2 and A3
hold.
Among problems that do not satisfy at least one of Assumptions A1–A3 (e.g.,
compactness of the sets Yi and Ai), we mention the linear-quadratic-Gaussian team
and the linear-exponential-Gaussian team [25].
In the rest of this section we describe an instance of Problem TO, whose formula-
tion is along the lines of [19, section 3]. It will be studied in detail in section 5, where
we provide conditions under which it satisfies Assumptions A1–A3.
Example: Optimal production in a multidivisional firm. A firm consists
of two autonomous divisions that produce two different goods in quantities a1 ∈
[0, a1,max] and a2 ∈ [0, a2,max], respectively. The goods are sold in two competitive
markets at prices ξ ∈ [ξmin, ξmax] and ζ ∈ [ζmin, ζmax], respectively. Because of random
fluctuations in supply and demand, ξ and ζ are known exactly only when the goods are
sold. Each division separately collects information about the market it sells in. The
information y1 ∈ [ξmin, ξmax]d1 available to the first division is represented by d1 price
forecasts of the good it produces and is exploited to decide, via the strategy s1(y1),
the produced amount a1. This is similar for the second division, whose information
is given by the d2-tuple y2 ∈ [ζmin, ζmax]d2 of price forecasts of the other good. So,
a1 = s1(y1) and a2 = s2(y2). The firm’s revenue is ξa1 + ζa2 and the total cost of












where c11, c22 > 0 and c12 	= 0. The choice of a quadratic function may be motivated,
for example, by a second-order local approximation of a nonquadratic one. As c12 	= 0,
in general the optimal choice of each division depends on the behavior of the other
division.
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The price levels ξ and ζ are modeled by real-valued random variables. For each
realization of the prices ξ, ζ and price forecasts y1, y2, the firm’s net profit is given by










The two divisions collaborate toward the maximization of the firm’s expected net
profit by choosing suitable production strategies. The optimal production levels can
be found by solving the following static team optimization problem.
Problem OPMF (optimal production in a multidivisional firm). Given a
joint probability density function ρ((ξ, ζ), y1, y2) for the prices ξ, ζ, the price forecasts






2) ∈ argmax {v(s1, s2) | si ∈ M(Yi, Ai), i = 1, 2} ,
where v(s1, s2)  Eξ,ζ,y1,y2 {U(ξ, ζ, s1(y1), s2(y2))}.
Problem OPMF is an instance of Problem TO with a two-dimensional state of
the world x  (ξ, ζ) ∈ [ξmin, ξmax] × [ζmin, ζmax], a number n = 2 of DMs, the
sets Y1  [ξmin, ξmax]d1 , Y2  [ζmin, ζmax]d2 , A1  [0, a1,max], A2  [0, a2,max], the
joint probability density function ρ(x, y1, y2)  ρ((ξ, ζ), y1, y2), and the team utility
u(x, s1(y1), s2(y2))  U(ξ, ζ, s1(y1), s2(y2)). The generalization of Problem OPMF to
n ≥ 2 divisions is straightforward.
In section 5, we shall specialize to Problem OPMF the smoothness properties
of Problem TO that we shall derive in section 3 and the estimates of accuracy of
suboptimal strategies that we shall obtain in section 4.
3. Smooth optimal strategies. In this section, we investigate existence and
uniqueness of smooth optimal strategies for Problem TO. According to the next
lemma, their search in the space M(Yi, Ai) of bounded measurable functions from
Yi to Ai can be restricted within the space C(Yi, Ai) of continuous functions from Yi
to Ai.
Lemma 3.1. Let Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Then
sup
{
v(s1, . . . , sn)
∣∣ si ∈ M(Yi, Ai), i = 1, . . . , n}
= sup
{
v(s1, . . . , sn)
∣∣ si ∈ C(Yi, Ai), i = 1, . . . , n}.(5)
The next theorem gives conditions guaranteeing that for a utility function of
class Cm, Problem TO has a solution made up of an n-tuple of strategies with a
degree of smoothness that grows linearly with m. The theorem provides a higher
degree of smoothness than [17, Theorem 1] and [24, Theorem 11, p. 162]. To this
end, Assumption A3 plays a basic role. See section 6 for a discussion of some useful
consequences of such a higher degree of smoothness.
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumptions A1–A3 hold. Then Problem TO has an n-tuple
(s◦1, . . . , s
◦
n) of optimal strategies with partial derivatives that are Lipschitz up to the
order m− 2.
Some estimates of the Lipschitz constants of the optimal strategies are given in
section 6.
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The next theorem states that under an additional condition, the optimal n-tuple
of smooth strategies is unique. For simplicity, we consider n = 2 DMs; the extension
to n ≥ 2 DMs can be made taking the hint from [31, section 6].
Theorem 3.3. Let Assumptions A1–A3 hold with n = 2, u be a quadratic func-









∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂a1,q∂a2,r u(x, y1, y2, a1, a2)
∣∣∣∣.
Then, Problem TO has a unique optimal pair (s◦1, s
◦
2) of strategies in Cm−2(Y1, A1)×
Cm−2(Y2, A2).
Another situation in which the optimal strategies are unique occurs when the
team utility function u is strictly concave with respect to the decision variables. The
following theorem states this fact.
Theorem 3.4. Let Assumptions A1–A3 hold and the team utility function
u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) be strictly concave with respect to (a1, . . . , an). Then Prob-
lem TO has a unique optimal n-tuple (s◦1, . . . , s◦n) of strategies in Cm−2(Y1, A1)×· · ·×
Cm−2(Yn, An).
4. Accuracies of suboptimal strategies. Closed-form solutions to Problem
TO can be found only in particular cases (see the introduction). In general, only
suboptimal solutions can be obtained. One possible way to find them consists of
using suitable approximation schemes, in which the search is restricted to strategies
having a simple form, e.g., linear combinations of a certain number of basis functions.
Classical approximation schemes in a normed function space H are formalized as
linear combinations of a certain number k of basis functions ϕ1, . . . , ϕk : R
d → R that






where the coefficients c1, . . . , ck are determined in such a way to minimize the distance
(measured using the norm of the space H) between the corresponding suboptimal
strategies and the optimal (unknown) one. For example, this is the case with algebraic
and trigonometric polynomials in the space of continuous functions on compact sets,
orthogonal polynomials in Lebesgue spaces [54], etc. As (6) is a linear combination of
k elements from a set of fixed-basis functions, it is called a fixed-basis approximation
scheme. Although fixed-basis approximation has many convenient properties (see,
e.g., [50]), often its applications are limited by the curse of dimensionality [7], i.e.,
a very fast (e.g., exponential) growth, as a function of the number d of variables (in
our case, the dimensions di, i = 1, . . . , n, of the information vectors yi available to
the DMs), of the number k of basis functions needed to achieve a desired accuracy of
approximation.
An alternative approximation scheme consists of using linear combinations of
basis functions ψ(·, w1), . . . , ψ(·, wk) obtained from a “mother function” ψ(·, w) by





where the vectors w1, . . . , wk are optimized together with the coefficients c1, . . . , ck.
In general, the presence of the “inner” parameter vectors w1, . . . , wk “destroys” lin-
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earity. So (7) is a nonlinear approximation scheme, which belongs to the fam-
ily of variable-basis approximation schemes [22, 27, 30]. With suitable choices of
the “mother function” ψ, (7) models a variety of approximating families widely
used in applications, such as free-node splines, trigonometric polynomials with free
frequencies and phases, radial-basis-function networks with adjustable centers and
widths, and feedforward neural networks [27]. Its use in functional optimization
(also called “infinite-dimensional programming”) was formalized in [58] and stud-
ied in [?, 14, 16, 28, 29, 57, 58]. Advantages of certain variable-basis approximation
schemes of the form (7) over classical linear ones of the form (6) were investigated,
e.g., in [5, 13, 22, 27, 30] for function approximation and in [14, 28, 58] for functional
optimization.
In the following, we shall derive upper bounds on the distance between the value
of the team, i.e., the quantity sups1,...,sn v(s1, . . . , sn), and the suboptimal values when
solutions are searched for within a subset of strategies expressed via certain variable-
basis approximation schemes. Then, we shall estimate the minimum number k of
basis functions required to guarantee a desired accuracy in approximating the value
of the team (i.e., to guarantee that the difference between the value of the team and
the expected value of the team utility when suitable variable-basis strategies are used
is below a desired threshold).
As a first step, the following theorem allows one to reduce Problem TO to a
function approximation problem.
Theorem 4.1. Let u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) be Lipschitz with constant L with
respect to (a1, . . . , an) and suppose that Problem TO has a solution (s
◦
1, . . . , s
◦
n). Then,
for every n-tuple (s1, . . . , sn) of strategies one has
v(s◦1, . . . , s
◦






According to Theorem 4.1, in order to guarantee a satisfactory approximation of
the value of the team (i.e., the quantity sups1,...,sn v(s1, . . . , sn)) it is sufficient to get
a satisfactory approximation of an optimal n-tuple (s◦1, . . . , s
◦
n) of strategies.
Conversely, the following theorem shows that under suitable conditions, any “suf-
ficiently good” suboptimal solution to Problem TO is close to an optimal strategy
(s◦1, . . . , s
◦
n).
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions A1–A3 hold with m ≥ 3, let (s◦1, . . . , s◦n) be
an optimal n-tuple of strategies, and assume that for some τ̄ > 0 the team utility
function u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) is strongly concave with constant τ̄ with respect
to (a1, . . . , an). Then for every ε > 0 and every n-tuple (s1, . . . , sn) of continuous
strategies one has
v(s◦1, . . . , s
◦







In the remainder of this section, we consider the approximation of the optimal
strategies by the variable-basis scheme (7) with three kinds of basis functions: cosines
with variable centers and phases, sigmoids, and Gaussians with variable centers and
widths. For the sake of notational simplicity and without loss of generality, we suppose
that the sets Ai are “multidimensional boxes,” as stated in the next assumption.







with ali,j < a
u
i,j , i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , li.
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For i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , li, we denote by si,j the jth component of si and
by PrjAi,j the projection operator onto Ai,j  [ali,j , aui,j ]. By Assumption A4, every






gi : Yi → R






, h ∈ N, θi,r ∈ [0, 2π)
}
(8)
the set of cosine basis functions and by
S
(k)




i : Yi → Ai







ci,j,q ∈ R, gi,j,q ∈ Gi(cos, di), j = 1, . . . , li
}
(9)
the corresponding approximating set.
By σ : R → R we denote a sigmoid, i.e., a bounded and measurable function
satisfying limt→−∞ σ(t) = 0 and limt→+∞ σ(t) = 1 (see, e.g., [11]). The basis set
corresponding to sigmoids and the associated approximating set are denoted by
Gi(σ, di) 
{
gi : Yi → R








i : Yi → Ai











For the approximation with Gaussian computational units, we denote by
Gi(Gauss, di) 
{
gi : Yi → R
∣∣∣ gi(yi) = e− ‖yi−ti‖2bi , ti ∈ Rdi, bi > 0
}
the basis set and by
S
(k)




i : Yi → Ai







ci,j,q ∈ R, gi,j,q ∈ Gi(Gauss, di), j = 1, . . . , li
}
(11)
the corresponding approximating set.
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumptions A1–A4 hold and
(i) m > maxi{di}2 + 2
or
(ii) m odd and m > maxi{di}+ 1.
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Then there exists a positive constant C such that for every positive integer k there is
an n-tuple of strategies (s̃
(k)
1 , . . . , s̃
(k)
n ) such that




1 , . . . , s̃
(k)














in the case (ii), i = 1, . . . , n.
According to Theorem 4.3, using a k-term variable-basis approximation of the
optimal strategies, the difference between the value of the team and its suboptimal
value is bounded from above by a term proportional to k−1/2. Thus, to guarantee an
approximation accuracy ε > 0 it is sufficient to use
k ≥ C2 ε−2
basis functions. Hence, the minimum required number of basis functions grows at
most quadratically with the inverse of the desired accuracy ε, thus avoiding the curse
of dimensionality.
5. Application example: Optimal production in a multidivisional firm.
In this section, we shall illustrate our results on two instances of Problem OPMF
described in section 2. More specifically, we shall approximate the optimal strategies
s◦1(y1) and s◦2(y2) of a two-divisional firm that produces two different types of goods.
In the first example, called “Instance A,” each division has at its disposal merely one
price forecast of the type of goods it produces. In “Instance B,” instead, the divisions
know three price forecasts of the respective products. In both cases, we report the
results of numerical simulations and make comparisons with the situation in which
each division has a complete knowledge of the price forecasts of both types of goods
(i.e., when the decision strategies are “centralized”).
If the constraints on the decisions a1, a2, the state of the world x  (ξ, ζ), and the
information y1, y2 are removed and the joint probability density function ρ(x, y1, y2)
is Gaussian, then closed-form solutions to Problem OPMF can be derived by using
classical results from team decision theory and the optimal strategies are linear in
the information [34]. However, a Gaussian probability density function may be un-
realistic [19]; in particular, in Problem OPMF it implies that there exists a positive
probability of negative prices. When the Gaussian assumption does not hold, closed-
form solutions to Problem OPMF are not available [19], even with a quadratic utility,
and suboptimal solutions have to be searched for. To this end, the knowledge of
smoothness properties of the (unknown) optimal solutions can be fruitfully exploited.
The following proposition guarantees for Problem OPMF the existence of op-
timal strategies that have Lipschitz partial derivatives up to the order m − 2 and
estimates the accuracies of suboptimal strategies expressed as linear combinations of
sinusoidal, sigmoidal, or Gaussian variable-basis functions. The proposition follows
by Theorems 3.2 and 4.3.
Proposition 5.1. If Assumptions A1–A4 hold, then Problem OPMF has a so-
lution made up of strategies with partial derivatives that are Lipschitz up to the order
m− 2. Moreover, if
(i) m > maxi{di}2 + 2
or
(ii) m odd and m > maxi{di}+ 1,
then there exists a positive constant C such that for every positive integer k there is


























in the case (ii), i = 1, 2.
It is worth remarking that Proposition 5.1 still holds if the quadratic utility func-
tion (4) is replaced by a function of class Cm for which Assumption A2 holds.
Let us now describe two instances of Problem OPMF and the simulation results
obtained for each of them.
Instance A. The two divisions produce two types of goods in quantities a1 ∈
A1  [0, 12] and a2 ∈ A2  [0, 12], respectively. The products are sold at prices ξ and
ζ, which are independent and uniformly distributed in the interval [2, 10]. The price
forecasts y1 and y2 are independently generated in the intervals Y1 = Y2  [2, 10],
according to two truncated Gaussian conditional probability density functions (with
respect to ξ and ζ, respectively), with conditional means ξ and ζ and conditional
variances ξ2 and ζ2, respectively (computed before truncation). The coefficients of
the utility function U(ξ, ζ, s1(y1), s2(y2)) (see (4)) are c11 = c22  1 and c12  0.15.
Proposition 5.2. Instance A of Problem OPMF satisfies Assumptions A1–A4.
The simulations were performed by constraining the strategies s1 and s2 to take
on the form of variable-basis functions (see (7)) with sinusoidal, sigmoidal (specifically,
the hyperbolic tangent was used), and Gaussian bases. The expectation operator in
the firm’s expected net profit was approximated by using an empirical mean computed
over a number L of realizations of the random variables. More specifically, let us
denote by ξl, ζl, yl1, and y
l
2 the lth realizations (l = 1, . . . , L) of the variables ξ, ζ, y1,
and y2, respectively. We emphasize the dependencies of the parametrized strategies


























where ω2  (c2,1, . . . , c2,k, w2,1, . . . , w2,k) and the function ψ may be a sigmoid, a
Gaussian, or a sinusoid. Each parameter vector ωi, i = 1, 2, contains k coefficients of
the linear combinations and k vectors of “inner” parameters of the basis functions.
Once the number k of basis functions, their type, and the number L of realizations





vemp (ω1, ω2) ,
where the superscript “emp” means “empirical” and
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Table 1
Simulation results for Instance A of Problem OPMF.
Basis Expected net profit Simulation time (s)
functions k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Sinusoidal 33.945 34.402 34.785 35.151 76.3 322.5 945.5 1.58·103
Sigmoidal 33.949 34.604 34.818 34.991 110.5 500.4 748.4 1.27·103
Gaussian 34.085 34.104 34.187 34.259 753.0 2.17·103 2.95·103 3.00·103








































2 with k = 10 basis functions
obtained for Instance A of Problem OPMF.
The maximization (12) entails a mathematical programming problem, to which
we have applied the sequential quadratic programming algorithm [39]. Because, in
general, problem (12) is nonconvex, the algorithm may be trapped in local maxima.
In order to mitigate this risk, we adopted a multistart technique, which consists of
solving (12) for several different initial values of the parameter vectors ω1 and ω2 and
choosing the vectors ω∗1 and ω
∗
2 corresponding to the largest value of v
emp at the end
of the optimization. In all the simulations, the empirical mean was computed over a
number L = 100 of realizations of the random variables. The code for the simulations
was written in MATLAB and the optimizations were performed using the routine
fmincon of the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox (version 5.1 included in MATLAB
7.11). All the simulations were run on a PC with the Windows XP operating system,
a 1.8 GHz Intel Core2 Duo CPU, and 2 GB RAM.
Table 1 presents the values of the firm’s expected net profit vemp corresponding
to the three types of variable-basis approximators with different numbers k of basis
functions, together with the times (in seconds) needed to perform the simulations.









with k = 10 basis functions.
The best performances in terms of expected net profit are obtained via sinusoidal
variable-basis functions. As expected, a larger number k of basis functions provides a
higher value of the profit, i.e., a higher approximation accuracy is achieved by using a
larger number of basis functions. However, such an increase of performance is smaller
when using Gaussian basis functions with respect to the sigmoidal and sinusoidal
cases. Concerning the simulation times, the Gaussian basis functions require the
largest computational effort; the simulation times of the sinusoidal and sigmoidal
basis functions are smaller and quite similar.
224 G. GNECCO, M. SANGUINETI, AND M. GAGGERO
Table 2
Simulation results in the presence of centralization for Instance A of Problem OPMF.
Basis Expected net profit Simulation time (s)
functions k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Sinusoidal 33.988 34.791 36.150 36.748 86.5 273.5 1.02·103 2.41·103
Sigmoidal 34.005 34.677 34.980 35.595 155.8 1.57·103 2.00·103 4.66·103
Gaussian 34.108 34.468 34.846 34.914 2.44·103 1.14·104 1.67·104 1.88·104
Let us now compare these results with the case in which each of the two divisions
knows the price forecasts of both types of products. We shall refer to this case with
the term “centralized,” as the decisions are taken with the knowledge of the whole
information available on the two types of products. Equivalently, one can think that
there exists a unique DM with information (y1, y2) and vector-valued strategies, to
which one can apply a “centralized version” of Proposition 5.1. In this situation,
each strategy depends on both forecasts y1 and y2. We denote the two centralized
strategies by scentr1 (y1, y2) and s
centr
2 (y1, y2), respectively.
Like in the previous case, the code for the simulations was written in MATLAB
by using the routine fmincon of the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox (version 5.1
included in MATLAB 7.11). All the simulations were run on a PC with the Windows
XP operating system, a 1.8 GHz Intel Core2 Duo CPU, and 2 GB RAM.
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained in the centralized case, using a suitably
modified version of (13) for the empirical mean. The centralized suboptimal strategies
provide better results than those obtained in the decentralized case: the values of the
firm’s expected net profit reported in Table 2 are larger than the corresponding values
reported in Table 1. Indeed, having at one’s disposal more information allows one
to devise more effective strategies. However, the computational effort is larger than
that of the decentralized case, as each strategy scentr1 and s
centr
2 is a function of two
variables instead of merely one. Thus, the number k of basis functions being the
same, the number of parameters to be optimized in the centralized case is larger than
the corresponding number in the decentralized context. Finally, note that the gap
between the centralized and decentralized cases increases when the number k of basis
functions increases.
Instance B. As in Instance A, the firm is made up of two divisions that produce
two types of goods in quantities a1 ∈ A1  [0, 12] and a2 ∈ A2  [0, 12], respectively,
sold at prices ξ and ζ independently and uniformly distributed in the interval [2, 10].
Now, however, each division has at its disposal three forecasts of the prices of the
good it produces: y1,1, y1,2, and y1,3 for the first type and y2,1, y2,2, and y2,3 for the
second type. Letting y1  (y1,1, y1,2, y1,3) and y2  (y2,1, y2,2, y2,3), the strategies
can be expressed as functions s1(y1) and s2(y2), respectively. The price forecasts y1
and y2 are independently generated in the three-dimensional cube Y1 = Y2  [2, 10]3.
The forecasts y1,1, y1,2, and y1,3 are obtained according to truncated Gaussian condi-
tional probability density functions with respect to ξ, with conditional means ξ and
conditional variances ξ2, 2ξ2, and 3ξ2, respectively (computed before truncation).
Similarly, the forecasts y2,1, y2,2, and y2,3 are generated via truncated Gaussian con-
ditional probability density functions with respect to ζ, with conditional means ζ and
conditional variances ζ2, 2ζ2, and 3ζ2, respectively (computed before truncation).
Like in Instance A, the coefficients of the team utility function U(ξ, ζ, s1(y1), s2(y2))
are c11 = c22  1 and c12  0.15.
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Table 3
Simulation results for Instance B of Problem OPMF.
Basis Expected net profit Simulation time (s)
functions k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Sinusoidal 34.349 35.634 36.711 36.892 122.3 840.6 2.60·103 5.06·103
Sigmoidal 33.800 34.974 36.069 36.037 237.4 1.12·103 1.55·103 2.21·103
Gaussian 35.635 36.018 36.043 36.066 1.54·103 3.14·103 3.62·103 4.03·103
Table 4
Simulation results in the presence of centralization for Instance B of Problem OPMF.
Basis Expected net profit Simulation time (s)
functions k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 5 k = 10 k = 15 k = 20
Sinusoidal 35.071 36.863 36.910 36.915 450.0 3.10·103 1.16·104 2.21·104
Sigmoidal 34.035 35.094 36.138 36.323 1.02·103 2.95·103 8.32·103 1.19·104
Gaussian 35.769 36.104 36.203 36.366 9.79·103 1.62·104 1.87·104 2.09·104
Proposition 5.3. Instance B of Problem OPMF satisfies Assumptions A1–A4.
As done in Instance A, the numerical simulations were performed by searching for
strategies s1 and s2 expressed as variable-basis functions with sinusoidal, sigmoidal
(specifically, the hyperbolic tangent was used), and Gaussian bases. The expectation
in the objective function was approximated via an empirical mean (a suitably modified
version of (13)) computed over L = 100 realizations of the random variables. The
programming language and the computer platform used for the simulations are the
same as in Instance A.
Table 3 shows the values of the firm’s expected net profit obtained in corre-
spondence of the three types of approximation schemes with different numbers k of
variable-basis functions, together with the times (in seconds) needed to perform the
simulations.
For the values of the expected net profit, also for Instance B the best suboptimal
solutions are obtained using sinusoidal variable-basis functions. Likewise in the case
of Instance A, as expected, a larger number k of basis functions provides a higher
value of the expected net profit; however, such an increase in performance is smaller
when using Gaussian basis functions with respect to the sigmoidal and sinusoidal
cases. Concerning the simulation times, the Gaussian basis functions require the
largest computational effort. The simulation times of the sinusoidal and sigmoidal
basis functions are smaller and quite similar. By comparing Tables 1 and 3 we note
that, as expected, having at disposal more than one forecast on the price of goods
provides better results with respect to having a unique forecast.
Following the modus operandi of Instance A, we compared the results of Table
3 with the case in which each of the two divisions knows the price forecasts of both
types of products. We refer again to this case as “centralized,” since the decisions
are taken with the knowledge of the whole information available on the two types of
products. In this situation, both strategies depend on both vectors y1 and y2, i.e., we
have scentr1 (y1, y2) and s
centr
2 (y1, y2). Table 4 summarizes the results obtained in such
a centralized case. The programming language and the computer platform used to
perform the simulations are the same as in Instance A.
By comparing Tables 3 and 4, we note that the values of the firm’s expected net
profit in the centralized case are larger than the corresponding values of the decentral-
ized case. As in Instance A, having at one’s disposal a larger amount of information
allows one to devise more effective strategies and the gap between the centralized
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and decentralized cases increases if the number k of basis functions increases. The
computational effort needed to perform the approximation is larger for the central-
ized case, as each strategy scentr1 and s
centr
2 is a function of six variables instead of
the three variables on which each of the decentralized strategies s1 and s2 depends.
Indeed, the number k of basis functions being the same, the number of parameters to
be optimized in the centralized case is much larger than the corresponding number in
the decentralized case, and thus the optimization problem is more difficult to solve.
Finally note that, as expected, the increase of the computational time due to central-
ization is larger in the centralized situation of Instance B (each strategy depends on
six variables) than in the centralized case of Instance A (each strategy depends on
two variables).
6. Discussion. We have investigated team optimization problems with statisti-
cal information structure.
In the first part of the paper, we proved smoothness properties of the optimal
strategies for a family of team optimization problems. This represents our first con-
tribution.
Then, we exploited such properties to prove that the optimal strategies are in
the closures of the convex hulls of certain sets (see the proof of Theorem 4.3) and we
applied nonlinear approximation techniques in such a way to derive accurate subop-
timal solutions. This is our second contribution. The literature shows that typically
these nonlinear approximation tools (such as the Maurey–Jones–Barron theorem; see
again the proof of Theorem 4.3) are exploited either assuming that the functions to
be approximated belong to the closures of the convex hulls of some sets or restrict-
ing the search of approximators to such closures. Instead, we have proved that the
(unknown) optimal strategies do belong to them. To the best of our knowledge, the
proposed approach to the approximate solution of team optimization problems has
not been previously investigated.
Finally, we illustrated the results on a team optimization problem that models
production planning in a firm where various divisions collaborate toward the maxi-
mization of the firm’s expected net profit, on the basis of stochastic information given
by forecasts of the selling prices.
6.1. The curse of dimensionality. The term “curse of dimensionality,” coined
by Bellman [7], is used in the optimization literature in different contexts. Such con-
texts share the feature of unmanageable growth, with respect to a problem’s “dimen-
sion,” of the resources (typically, computational time and/or memory requirements)
required to solve the problem itself. In this paper, the curse of dimensionality refers
to an exponential growth, as a function of the number d of variables, of the number
k of basis functions needed to achieve a desired accuracy of suboptimal solutions; d
plays the role of “dimension” of Problem TO. Our results provide a way to cope, at
least partially, with such a curse of dimensionality. More specifically, let the degree of
smoothness m of the team utility and of the probability density functions depend lin-
early on the maximum dimension maxi{di} of the information vectors yi, i = 1, . . . , n.
According to Theorem 4.3, if suitable variable-basis strategies with k Gaussian, si-
nusoidal, or sigmoidal computational units are used, then the difference between the
value of the team and the expected value of the utility is bounded from above by a
quantity of order k−1/2. So, to guarantee an approximation accuracy ε it is sufficient
to use a number k of basis functions that grows at most quadratically with 1/ε. This
may be interpreted as an instance of the so-called blessing of smoothness [42], which
compensates the curse of dimensionality.
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In related studies, [43] considered three curses of dimensionality: the curses of
dimensionality in the state space, in the outcome space, and in the action space (see
[43, section 1.2]). They prevent the efficient use of the classical dynamic programming
(DP) algorithm [7] for the solution of dynamic optimization problems with large
dimensions of the state space, and/or the outcome space, and/or the action space. In
some cases, such curses can be mitigated via the approximate dynamic programming
algorithm described in [43], which exploits stochastic approximation methods to find
approximate solutions to the Bellman optimality equations, on which DP is based.
For some classes of dynamic optimization problems, the above-mentioned blessing of
smoothness can be exploited to mitigate the curse of dimensionality in optimal-policy-
function approximation [16].
6.2. Trade-off between decentralization and smoothness. It is worth com-
paring the degree of smoothness of the team utility function required to apply Theo-
rem 4.3 with the degree of smoothness required to apply the same theorem in a cen-
tralized context, i.e., when there is only one DM with information vector (y1, . . . , yn) ∈∏n
i=1 Yi ⊂ R
∑n
i=1 di . Obviously, the value of the “one-member team” is larger than
or equal to the value of the “decentralized team” but the centralized version has at
least two drawbacks: the cost of making the whole information available to a single
DM and the larger degree m of smoothness required to apply Theorem 4.3. Indeed, in
the centralized case the degree m of smoothness has to grow linearly with respect to∑n
i=1 di, whereas in the decentralized case with n DMs the linear growth is required
merely with respect to max{di, i = 1, . . . , n}.
6.3. Application of quasi-Monte Carlo methods. Another interesting con-
sequence of our results is the possibility for applying quasi-Monte Carlo methods [37]
and related ones, such as the Korobov method (see [56] and [26, Chapter 6]), for the
computations of the multivariable integral
v(s̃
(k)
1 , . . . , s̃
(k)









1 , . . . , s̃
(k)
n are approximations of the respective optimal strategies. Estimates
of the accuracies of such computations can be obtained via the Koksma–Hlawka in-
equality [37, p. 20], which requires that the integrands have finite variation in the
sense of Hardy and Krause [37, p. 19]. Considering, e.g., the case of an integrand f
defined on the r-dimensional unit-cube [0, 1]r, the formula (2.5) in [37, p. 19], which is
typically used to prove that f has a finite variation in the sense of Hardy and Krause,
requires that f ∈ Cr([0, 1]r), i.e., the degree of smoothness has to be at least equal
to the number of variables. When m ≥
∑n
i=0 di + 2 in Assumption A1, Theorem 3.2
provides such a degree of smoothness of the optimal strategies.
6.4. On the use of a greedy approximation algorithm. In deriving some
of our results (in particular, Theorem 4.3), we have exploited the Maurey–Jones–
Barron theorem [5, Lemma 1, p. 934] (see also [21, 41]). It allows one to deal with the
case of a utility function u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) that is separately strongly concave
with constant τ with respect to each decision variable a1, . . . , an. When the utility
is strongly concave with respect to the whole decision vector (a1, . . . , an), variable-
basis suboptimal strategies with accuracies of the same order k−1/2 can be obtained
by exploiting, instead of the Maurey–Jones–Barron theorem, the greedy algorithm
developed in [55] to maximize strongly-concave functionals over the convex hull of
a set of basis functions. At each iteration, the algorithm proposed therein selects
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a suitable basis function and solves a one-dimensional mathematical programming
problem. The application of such algorithm to Problem TO with strongly concave
utility function is made possible by the structural properties of the optimal strategies
(see the proof of Theorem 4.3).
Let us consider, e.g., the proof of Theorem 4.3(i), where we have shown that each
function s◦i,j belongs to the closure of the convex hull of the set Gi,j(cos, di). For a
utility function u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) that is strongly concave with respect to the












follows by [55, Theorem IV.2]1 and the properties of the modulus of concavity of a
functional stated, e.g., in [28, Proposition 4.2(iii), (iv)] (the latter is applied to the
objective functional in Problem TO). The advantage over the proof based on the
Maurey–Jones–Barron theorem is that the approach developed in [55] also provides
an algorithm (see [55, Algorithm II.1]) to find such a function s̃
(k)
i,j . The disadvantage
is that to apply the results from [55] the utility function u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) has
to be strongly concave with respect to the whole decision vector (a1, . . . , an), instead
of merely separately strongly concave with respect to each decision variable.
As the numerical results that we presented in section 5 are not the core of the
paper but are intended to demonstrate the way in which the theoretical results can
be exploited and applied to concrete situations, in the simulations we have not imple-
mented [55, Algorithm II.1]. Instead, we have solved a nonlinear least squares problem
via nonlinear optimization (sequential quadratic programming) combined with a mul-
tistart technique, which applies to the more general case of a utility function that is
separately strongly concave.
6.5. Application to network team optimization problems. Such problems
arise in optimization, management, and control of traffic networks. Such networks
include, e.g., computer networks extending in large geographical areas, store-and-
forward packet-switching telecommunication networks, large-scale freeway systems,
reservoir networks in water-management systems, and queueing networks in manu-
facturing systems. They can be modeled as graphs in which a set of nodes (with
storing capabilities) are connected through a set of links (where traffic delays and
transport costs may be incurred) that cannot be loaded with traffic above their ca-
pacities. In this context, the team utility function u can be written as the sum of
a finite number of individual utility functions ui, each one associated with a single
DM (e.g., a telecommunications router) or a shared resource in the network (e.g., a
communication link). In addition, each ui depends only on a subset of the DMs [48].
The DMs are the nodes of a graph, and there is an edge between two DMs iff both
appear in the same individual utility function. Traffic flows can be described by con-
tinuous variables, even if the “objects” exchanged among the nodes are discrete in
nature (e.g., data packets, messages, cars, workpieces). This is justified whenever the
number of objects is so large as to require macroscopic modeling. In store-and-forward
packet-switching telecommunication networks, for instance, the DMs are the routers
1Note that [55, Theorem IV.2] refers to an optimization problem set on the convex hull of a set
of functions. However, inspection of its proof shows that for a continuous objective functional [55,
Theorem IV.2] can be applied to a problem formulated in the closure of the convex hull of such a
set.
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acting as members of a team (they aim at maximizing a common objective related,
e.g., to the congestions of the links). Each router has at its disposal some private
information (e.g., the total lengths of its incoming packet queues), on the basis of
which it decides how to split the incoming traffic flows into its output links.
The importance of deriving suboptimal solutions to network team optimization
problems originates from the fact that closed-form solutions can be derived only in
particular cases (typically, under LQG hypotheses and, in the dynamic case, partially
nested information; see the introduction). The particular structure of a network team
optimization allows for various simplifications in our model and results.
• As the strategy of each DM is influenced only by those of its neighbors in the
network, Assumption A3 is easier to impose.
• An extension of Theorem 3.3 to n ≥ 2 DMs can be formulated in terms
of interaction terms βi,j (defined in a similar way as β1,2 in Theorem 3.3),
where each (i, j) is a pair of different DMs in the team. For a network team
optimization problem, most βi,j are expected to be equal to 0 (since the
interaction of each DM is limited to its neighbors in the graph); therefore
such an extension takes on a simplified form.
• Since the utility function can be written as the sum of individual utility
functions, the integral Ex,y1,...,yn{u(x, {yi}ni=1, {si(yi)}ni=1)}  v(s1, . . . , sn)
(see (2)) can be decomposed into the sum of a finite number of integrals,
each typically dependent on less than
∑n
i=0 di variables. So, in quasi-Monte
Carlo methods the minimum degree m of smoothness required by [37, p. 19,
formula (2.5)] to prove for each integrand the finiteness of its variation in the
sense of Hardy and Krause is smaller than
∑n
i=0 di + 2. (Compare with the
general case discussed above.)
As to specific applications to network team optimization, our smoothness results
may be applied, e.g., to stochastic versions of the congestion, routing, and band-
width allocation problems considered in [32], which are stated in terms of smooth and
concave individual utility functions.
6.6. On the Lipschitz constants of the optimal strategies. Inspection of
the proof of Theorem 3.2 allows one to estimate the Lipschitz constants of the optimal
strategies. By applying formulas (3) and (27) for y′′i −y′i in the direction of the gradient
of ŝji,h and taking the limit as j goes to +∞, some computations provide the following
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Once the joint probability density function ρ is chosen, this bound can be exploited
to keep under control the Lipschitz constant of the optimal strategies, at the expense
of some computations.
As an example, let us consider the case of a uniform joint probability density
function ρ. Such a choice is quite meaningful: for instance, for a scalar random variable
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it represents a situation of maximum uncertainty, in the sense that it maximizes the
differential entropy [10] among all joint probability density functions on a compact








∣∣∣∣∂2u(x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an)∂yi,q∂ai,r
∣∣∣∣ ,
where the supremum is with respect to (x, y1, . . . , yn, a1, . . . , an) ∈ X ×
∏n
i=1 Yi ×∏n
i=1 Ai , q = 1, . . . , di, and r = 1, . . . , li. So, the dependence of the Lipschitz constant
of the optimal strategies on the number n of DMs can be controlled via the dependence
on n of the constant τ of separate concavity of the utility function u and the largest
absolute values of its second-order derivatives ∂
2u(x,y1,...,yn,a1,...,an)
∂yi,q∂ai,r
. Note that the
upper bound (15) shows the dependence on the dimensions di and li. The Lipschitz
constant does not blow up with di and li. Indeed, its rate of growth is quite slow: it




li of the square roots of the “dimensions”
di and li of the problem. It is worth remarking that moderately large values of n and
small values of di and li are of practical interest, as they correspond to situations in
which one has many DMs, each with a simple structure (i.e., small dimensions of the
decision and information vectors).
A family of problems and associated utility functions u, which can be modeled in
the form of Problem TO and for which a good control of the Lipschitz constants can
be obtained, is represented by the network team optimization problems discussed in
section 6.5. They share the following characteristics: (i) the strategy of each DM is
influenced only by those of its neighbors in the network, (ii) the utility function can
be written as the sum of individual utility functions, and (iii) as the interaction of
each DM is limited to its neighbors in the graph, each utility function depends only on
a small number of DMs. Let us investigate the consequences of such features on the
upper bound (15) on the Lipschitz constant and, in particular, its dependence on the
number n of DMs. As the utility function is the sum of individual utility functions,
the constant τ of separate strong concavity can be considered to be independent of n.
Moreover, as each individual utility function depends only on a small number of DMs




from above independently of n. In such a way, one can keep the Lipschitz constants
of the optimal strategies under control.
6.7. Extensions to other n-person games. Problem TO is a particular case
of n-person games (also called pure coordination games [49], a particular case of po-
tential games [45]), in which the players share the same objective functional. Our
smoothness results can be extended to games in which different players may have
different objectives. In particular, the technique used in Step 1 of the proof of The-
orem 3.2 may be applied to prove analogous smoothness properties for n-tuples of
strategies representing a Nash equilibrium in an infinite-dimensional stochastic n-
person game, like those studied in [31] and [35]. For instance, [31] provides sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium but it does not
address the smoothness of the strategies. By our approach, one can investigate a suf-
ficiently high degree of smoothness of such strategies and search for suboptimal ones
implemented by variable-basis approximation schemes with k computational units,
which represent an ε-Nash equilibrium [6, section 4.2] for ε = O(1/k2) (thus without
incurring the curse of the dimensionality). Such smoothness results may be of interest
also in the context of the so-called algorithmic game theory [38].
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Finally, we mention the following interpretation of our results in terms of a game:
the larger the degree of smoothness of the optimal strategies, the smaller the relevance
of each component of the information vector available to each player in finding an
optimal strategy. More specifically, a small variation of such a component implies
a small variation of the optimal decision and, keeping the other factors unchanged,
the dependence decreases by increasing the degree of smoothness. Roughly speaking,
this property allows one to efficiently approximate the optimal strategies with a small
number of terms in suitable variable-basis approximation schemes.
7. Proofs. Recall that a subset F of the space C(Ω) of continuous functions on
Ω ⊆ Rd is equicontinuous at z ∈ Ω iff for every ε > 0 there exists a neighborhood
U of z such that for every w ∈ U and every f ∈ F one has |f(z) − f(w)| ≤ ε.
The set F is equicontinuous iff it is equicontinuous at every z ∈ Ω. The Ascoli–Arzelá
Theorem [1, Theorem 1.33, p. 11] states that for a compact set Ω ⊂ Rd, a set F ⊂ C(Ω)
is compact in C(Ω) iff it is closed, bounded, and equicontinuous.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The proof proceeds as in Step 1 of the proof of [17, Theo-
rem 1]; for completeness, we report it here. We give the proof for the case of n = 2
DMs, then we mention the changes required for the extension to n > 2.
Proof for n = 2. Consider a sequence {sj1, s
j
2} of pairs of strategies, indexed by








(Such a sequence exists by the definition of supremum.) From this sequence, we
generate the sequence {ŝj1, ŝ
j
2} defined for every y1 ∈ Y1 and every y2 ∈ Y2 as
ŝj1(y1)  argmax
a1∈A1





Ex,y1 |y2{u(x, y1, y2, ŝ
j
1(y1), a2)}.(17)
The proof is structured as follows. First, we show that for every j ∈ N+, ŝj1 and
ŝj2 are well-defined (i.e., the maxima in (16) and (17) exist and are uniquely achieved)
and continuous, so it makes sense to evaluate v(ŝj1, ŝ
j
2). Thus, by (2), (16), (17), and















We detail the proof for ŝj1; the same arguments hold for ŝ
j
2.
Let us show that for every j ∈ N+ the function ŝj1 is well-defined and continuous.
Let




(18) ŝj1(y1) = argmax
a1∈A1
M j1 (y1, a1).
As the probability density function ρ(x, y1, y2) is of class Cm and strictly positive
on X × Y1 × Y2, the conditional density ρ(x, y2|y1) = ρ(x,y1,y2)∫
X×Y2 ρ(x,y1,y2)dxdy2
is of class
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Cm on X×Y1×Y2. Let Ω be the open set containing X×Y1×Y2×A1×A2 on which
the team utility function u is of class Cm, and for i = 1, 2, let Ãi ⊃ Ai be compact
and such that X × Y1 × Y2 × Ã1 × Ã2 ⊂ Ω. Since ρ(x, y2|y1) and u are of class Cm
on the compact sets X × Y1 × Y2 and X × Y1 × Y2 × Ã1 × Ã2, respectively, M j1 is of
class Cm on the compact set Y1 × Ã1. (It is an integral dependent on parameters.)
By [17, Lemma 1], for every y1 ∈ Y1 the function M j1 (y1, ·) is Lipschitz and strongly
concave with constant τ on the open set int Ã1 ⊃ A1, where int Ã1 denotes the
topological interior of Ã1.
By the above-proved continuity and strong concavity properties of M j1 with re-
spect to a1, for every y1 ∈ Y1 the maximum in (18) exists and is unique, so the
function ŝj1(·) is well-defined. Moreover, by the necessary and sufficient optimality
condition stated in [8, Theorem 3.2, p. 138], 0 is a supergradient ofM j1 (y1, ·) for every
y1 ∈ Y1. Take y′1, y′′1 ∈ Y1. By the definition of ŝ
j
1, exploiting the strong concavity
with constant τ of M j1 (y
′

























































By summing (19) and (20) we have












































































Together, (21) and (22) give


































Let Λj be the Lipschitz constant of the function M j1 ∈ Cm(Y1 × Ã1). Then






















































1))| ≤ 2Λj‖y′′1 − y′1‖.
By (23) and (24), we obtain
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which proves the Hölder continuity of ŝj1, hence its continuity. The continuity of ŝ
j
2
can be derived in the same way.
Extension to n ≥ 2. One defines the n-tuple ŝj1, . . . , ŝjn of strategies
ŝj1(y1)  argmax
a1∈A1













Ex,{yi}i=n |yn{u(x, {yi}ni=1, {ŝ
j
i (yi)}n−1i=1 , an)}
and applies the same arguments as in the case n = 2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Also in this case, we detail the proof for n = 2 DMs. The
changes required for the extension to n ≥ 2 are the same as in the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Consider the sequence {ŝj1, ŝ
j
2} of pairs of strategies, indexed by j ∈ N+, defined








Step 1. Let us prove that ŝj1 and ŝ
j
2 are of class Cm−1 with upper bounds on the
absolute values of the partial derivatives (up to the order m− 1) of their components.
We show also that such bounds are independent on j and y1 for ŝ
j
1 and on j and y2
for ŝj2. We make the proof for ŝ
j
1; the same arguments hold for ŝ
j
2.
Step 1.a. First, we prove that ŝj1 is of class C1 and that its Lipschitz constant is
independent of j. As Y1 is convex, it is sufficient to show that the restriction of ŝ
j
1 to
each line joining every two points y′1 and y
′′
1 is Lipschitz with a constant that depends
neither on j nor on the line. Likewise in the proof of Lemma 3.1, let
M j1 (y1, a1)  Ex,y2|y1{u(x, y1, y2, a1, s
j
2(y2))},
so by definition ŝj1(y1) = argmaxa1∈A1 M
j
1 (y1, a1). Consider the function ŝ
j
1(y1(t)),
where y1(t)  y′1 + t(y′′1 − y′1) and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. By Assumption A3 and the fact
that the maximum point in (18) exists and is unique, for every 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 we get














= 0, h = 1, . . . , l1.






1 (y1, a1)) ≤ −2τ < 0,
where ∇22,2 denotes the Hessian with respect to the second (vector-valued) variable.
Then we can apply the vectorial form of the implicit function theorem to (26) in
such a way to study the local differentiability of the vector-valued function ŝj1(y1(t)).
Indeed, taking the total derivative with respect to t of both sides of (26) and exploiting
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, using (27), and renaming the indices, for every h =



















































so a1(t) and ŝ
j
1,h(y1) are locally differentiable. As this holds for every y1 ∈ Y1, ŝ
j
1,h(y1)













| in (28), independent of y1 and j. By definition, we have
M j1 (y1, a1) =
∫
X×Y2 ρ(x, y1, y2)u(x, y1, y2, a1, s
j
2(y2))dxdy2∫
X×Y2 ρ(x, y1, y2)dxdy2
.
Simple calculations allow one to express
∂2Mj1
∂y1,q∂a1,r
as a ratio whose numerator, for




















whereas its denominator is (
∫
X×Y2 ρ(x, y1, y2)dxdy2)
3 ≥ δ, where δ is a positive con-
stant (hence independent of y1), whose existence and independence of y1 are guaran-
teed by ρ(x, y1, y2) > 0 and the continuity of ρ(x, y1, y2) on the compact setX×Y1×Y2.
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Note that the change of order between expectation and up-to-second-order partial
derivatives is justified by the fact that ρ(x, y1, y2) and u(x, y1, y2, a1, a2) are of class
Cm on compact sets with m ≥ 2. Then, an upper bound on | ∂
2Mj1
∂y1,q∂a1,r
| can be ex-


























related to (29) and (30), respectively, where measurability of the integrands follows
by [47, Property (c), p. 38]. This bound does not depend on y1. Moreover, it does not
depend on the particular choice of sj2(y2), and therefore it is also independent of j.
Summing up, for every h = 1, . . . , l1 we have on |
d ŝj1,h(ŷ1(t))
d t | an upper bound
independent of y1 and j, where ŷ1(t)  y′1 + t(y′′1 − y′1). Hence, ŝ
j
1 is Lipschitz with a
constant independent of j.
Step 1.b. As M j1 is of class Cm, by taking higher-order partial derivatives of both
sides of (26) we conclude that ŝj1(y1) is locally of class Cm−1. As this holds for every
y1 ∈ Y1, it follows that ŝj1(y1) is of class Cm−1 on the whole Y1. Since M
j
1 has upper
bounds on the sizes of its partial derivatives up to the order m that are independent
of y1, a1, and j, then for every h = 1, . . . , l1 and every multi-index (i1, . . . , id1) such








upper bound that is independent of y1 and j.
Step 2. By Step 1.b, for every h = 1, . . . , l1 and every multi-index (i1, . . . , id1) such








are equibounded and have the same upper bound on their Lipschitz constants, so they
are equicontinuous on the compact set Y1. Hence, by the Ascoli–Arzelà theorem there







} that converges uniformly to a function defined
on Y1. Since this function is the pointwise limit of a sequences of equi-Lipschitz
functions, it is Lipschitz with the same bound on its Lipschitz constant.
Step 3. By integratingm−2 times, we conclude that there exists a subsequence of
{ŝj1} that converges uniformly to a strategy s◦1 ∈ Cm−2(Y1, A1) with Lipschitz (m−2)-
order partial derivatives. Similarly, we can prove that there exists a subsequence of
{ŝj2} that converges uniformly to s◦2 ∈ Cm−2(Y2, A2) with partial derivatives that are
Lipschitz up to the order m− 2.
Finally, by the continuity of the functional v(s1, s2) on C(Y1, A1) × C(Y2, A2)
with the respective sup-norms, we obtain v(s◦1, s
◦
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Proof of Theorem 3.3. Inspection of the proof of Lemma 3.1 shows that there exists
a (possibly nonlinear) operator T : C(Y1, A1)×C(Y2, A2) → C(Y1, A1)×C(Y2, A2) such
that
T1(s1, s2) = argmax
s1∈C(Y1,A1)
v(s1, s2),
T2(s1, s2) = argmax
s2∈C(Y2,A2)
v(T1(s1, s2), s2).
Moreover, it also shows that
T1(s1, s2)(y1) = argmax
a1
Ex,y2 |y1{u(x, y1, y2, a1, s2(y2))} ∀y1 ∈ Y1,
T2(s1, s2)(y2) = argmax
a2
Ex,y1 |y2{u(x, y1, y2, T1(s1, s2)(y1), a2)} ∀y2 ∈ Y2.




2 ) ∈ C(Y1, A1)×








2 ) is a necessary condition for its
optimality. (Otherwise there would exist a strictly better pair of strategies by an ap-
plication of the theorem on interchange of maximization and integration [46, Theorem
14.60].) Moreover, by the proof of Lemma 3.1 and the compactness of Y1 and Y2, for
every (s1, s2) ∈ C(Y1, A1) × C(Y2, A2) the strategies T1(s1, s2) and T2(s1, s2) belong
to the interiors (with respect to the associated sup-norms) of C(Y1, A1) and C(Y2, A2)
as subsets of C(Y1,Rl1) and C(Y2,Rl2), respectively, so Problem TO is reduced to an
unconstrained infinite-dimensional optimization problem on C(Y2,Rl2)× C(Y2,Rl2).
Now, we reduce Problem TO to an unconstrained infinite-dimensional game-
theory problem on a Hilbert space, to which one can apply the techniques developed
in [31] to investigate the stability of Nash equilibria. This can be done since every
pair of optimal strategies for Problem TO represents a Nash equilibrium for a two-
player game, for which the individual utilities are the same and equal to v(s1, s2). To





Ey2{‖s2(y2)‖2}, respectively; then we extend by density such spaces to the
Lebesgue spaces L2(Y1, ρy1 ,Rl1) and L2(Y2, ρy2 ,Rl2), respectively, where ρy1 and ρy2
are the marginal densities of y1 and y2. Note that thanks to the choice of a team util-
ity function that is quadratic with respect to a1 and a2, by removing the constraints
a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 the definition of the functional v(s1, s2) can be extended on the
space L2(Y1, ρy1 ,Rl1) × L2(Y2, ρ2,Rl2). Moreover, definition (33) of the operator T
can be extended on L2(Y1, ρy1 ,Rl1)× L2(Y2, ρ2,Rl2) by setting
T1(s1, s2)  argmax
s1∈L2(Y1,ρy1 ,Rl1)
v(s1, s2),
T2(s1, s2)  argmax
s2∈L2(Y2,ρy2 ,Rl2)
v(T1(s1, s2), s2).(33)
Indeed, nonemptyness of the sets argmax in (33) follows by the direct method of the
calculus of variations [12] by standard coercivity and upper-semicontinuity arguments.
The fact that they are singletons follows by strict concavity arguments.
Proceeding as in [23, Chapter XVII, section 3], we get the following expressions
for the Frechét differentials of the integral functional v up to the second order (we
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denote by hi and h
′
i the independent increments of si, i = 1, 2):
Ds1v(s1, s2){h1} = Ex,y1,y2{h1(y1)T∇4u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))}
 Ey1{h1(y1)T (∇s1v(s1, s2))(y1)},
Ds2v(s1, s2){h2} = Ex,y1,y2{h2(y2)T∇5u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))}
 Ey2{h2(y2)T (∇s2v(s1, s2))(y2)},
D2s1,s1v(s1, s2){h1, h
′
1} = Ex,y1,y2{h1(y1)T∇24,4u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))h′1(y1)}
 Ey1{h1(y1)T (∇2s1,s1v(s1, s2)h
′
1)(y1)},
D2s1,s2v(s1, s2){h1, h2} = Ex,y1,y2{h1(y1)
T∇24,5u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))h2(y2)}
 Ey1{h1(y1)T (∇2s1,s2v(s1, s2)h2)(y1)},(34)
D2s2,s1v(s1, s2){h2, h1} = Ex,y1,y2{h2(y2)
T∇25,4u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))h1(y1)}
 Ey2{h2(y2)T (∇2s2,s1v(s1, s2)h1)(y2)},(35)
D2s2,s2v(s1, s2){h2, h
′
2} = Ex,y1,y2{h2(y2)T∇25,5u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))h′2(y2)}
 Ey2{h2(y2)T (∇2s2,s2v(s1, s2)h
′
2)(y2)},
where, for every j, k = 1, 2, the symbols Dsj and Dsj ,sk denote Frechét derivatives,
∇sjv(s1, s2) is a function in L2(Yj , ρj ,Rlj ), and ∇sj ,skv(s1, s2) is a bounded linear op-
erator from L2(Yk, ρk,Rlk) to L2(Yj , ρj ,Rlj ). In particular, it follows by Assumption
A2 that
Ex,y1,y2{h1(y1)T∇24,4u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))h1(y1)} ≤ −2τEy1{‖h1(y1)‖2}
and
Ex,y1,y2{h2(y1)T∇25,5u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))h2(y2)} ≤ −2τEy2{‖h2(y2)‖2}.
Then for every j = 1, 2, by the expression of such an operator ∇sj ,sjv(s1, s2) (or by an
application of the Lax–Milgram theorem [2, p. 69]) it follows that (∇2sj ,sjv(s1, s2))−1
exists, it is a bounded operator, and ‖(∇2sj ,sjv(s1, s2))−1‖ ≤
1
2τ . By exploiting (34)
and (35), as the second-order terms ∇24,5u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2)) and ∇25,4u(x, y1, y2,
s1(y1), s2(y2)) do not depend on s1(y1) and s2(y2) we get
‖∇2s1,s2v(s1, s2)‖ = ‖∇
2









∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂a1,q∂a2,r u(x, y1, y2, a1, a2)
∣∣∣∣.(36)
Then, by applying [31, Theorem 1, formula (1)], it follows that T is a contraction
operator on L2(Y1, ρ1,Rl1)×L2(Y2, ρ2,Rl2) with a contraction constant bounded from
above by
β21,2




2 ), which necessarily
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coincides with (s◦1, s
◦
2). (It is also a fixed point of T and belongs to Cm−2(Y1, A1) ×
Cm−2(Y2, A2).)
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Suppose by contradiction that there exists another optimal
n-tuple (s◦
′
1 , . . . , s
◦′
n ) ∈ C(Y1, A1) × · · · × C(Yn, An) of strategies. For λ ∈ (0, 1), let
(s′1, . . . , s
′
n)  λ(s◦1, . . . , s◦n) + (1− λ)(s◦
′
1 , . . . , s
◦′
n ). (Note that this is an admissible n-
tuple of strategies, as s′i : Yi → Ai.) By the strict concavity of the team utility function
u with respect to (a1, . . . , an) and the fact that the n-tuples (s
◦′
1 (y1), . . . , s
◦′
n (yn)) and
(s◦1(y1), . . . , s
◦
n(yn)) differ on a set of (strictly) positive measure, we have
Ex,y1,...,yn {u(x, {yi}ni=1, {s′i(yi)}ni=1)}









v(s1, . . . , sn) |si∈C(Yi, Ai), i=1, . . . , n
}
,
which contradicts the optimality of (s◦
′
1 , . . . , s
◦′
n ). Thus, (s
◦
1, . . . , s
◦
n) is the unique
optimal n-tuple of strategies in C(Y1, A1)×· · ·×C(Yn, An) (and also in Cm−2(Y1, A1)×
· · · × Cm−2(Yn, An)).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let us consider n = 2 DMs. The general case can be
proved similarly. For an integrable real-valued random variable z and a measurable
concave function f , the Jensen inequality [47, Theorem 3.3, p. 62] gives
(37) f (Ez{z}) ≥ Ez {f(z)} .
By the existence of an optimal solution, the Lipschitz continuity of the team utility
function u, and (37) we get
v(s◦1, s
◦
2)− v(s1, s2) = Ex,y1,y2{u(x, y1, y2, s◦1(y1), s◦2(y2)) − u(x, y1, y2, s1(y1), s2(y2))}
≤ L · Ex,y1,y2
{√
‖s◦1(y1)− s1(y1)‖2 + ‖s◦2(y2)− s2(y2)‖2
}















Proof of Theorem 4.2. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, Problem TO is
reduced to an unconstrained infinite-dimensional optimization problem on C(Y1, A1)×
· · ·×C(Yn, An), where each space C(Yi,Rli) ⊃ C(Yi, Ai) is endowed with the respective
sup-norm, i = 1, . . . , n. By the necessary first-order optimality condition, the first-
order Frechét derivatives of the integral functional v computed at (s◦1, . . . , s
◦
n) are
equal to 0. So, by exploiting the concavity of the functional v (which follows by the
assumptions on u) and the Taylor theorem with Lagrange’s remainder, we get




where h = (s1 − s◦1, . . . , sn − s◦n), (s1, . . . , sn) is any other n-tuple of admissible con-
tinuous strategies, and χ  (χ1, . . . , χn) belongs to the segment between (s1, . . . , sn)
and the optimal solution (s◦1, . . . , s
◦
n).
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As by assumption m ≥ 3, proceeding as in [23, Chapter XVII, section 3], the
second-order Frechét differential D2v(χ){h, h} has the expression
Ex,y1,...,yn{(h1(y1), . . . ,hn(yn))T∇2(n+2,...,2n+1),(n+2,...,2n+1)
u(x, y1, . . . , yn, χ1(y1), . . . , χn(yn))(h1(y1), . . . , hn(yn))},
which by (3) is bounded from above by






The statement follows by this last bound and (38).
For Ω ⊆ Rd and 1 ≤ p < ∞, we denote the corresponding Lebesgue space
and norm by Lp(Ω) and ‖ · ‖Lp(Ω), respectively. For Ω open, a positive integer m
and 1 ≤ p < ∞, we denote by Wm,p(Ω) the Sobolev space of functions whose weak
partial derivatives up to the order m are in Lp(Ω). By C∞(Ω) we denote the space of
functions on Ω that are continuous together with their partial derivatives up to every
order; C0(Ω) and C∞0 (Ω) are the spaces of functions in C(Ω) and C∞(Ω), respectively,
with compact supports in Ω [1, p. 2]. We denote by Wm,p0 (Ω) the closure of C∞0 (Ω)
in the Sobolev space Wm,p(Ω) (see [1, p. 59]). For α > 0, the Bessel potential of
order α on Rd, denoted by Bα(x), is the inverse Fourier transform of the function
B̂α(ω)  (2π)−
d
2 (1 + ‖ω‖2)−α/2. When α > d, the function Bα is continuous [51,
p. 132]. For α > 0 and 1 ≤ p < ∞, Bαp (Rd) is the Bessel potential space, whose
elements are functions u such that u = f ∗ Bα, where f ∈ Lp(Rd) [51, p. 134].
For completeness, we report the statement of [15, Corollary 5.2], as we shall
exploit it in the proof of Theorem 4.3(ii).
Theorem 7.1 (see [15, Corollary 5.2]). Let d be a positive integer and α > d. For
every f ∈ Bα1 (Rd) and every positive integer k, there exist t1, . . . , tk ∈ Rd, b1, . . . , bk >













where K(α, d)  2−d/2 Γ(α/2−d/2)Γ(α/2) ‖λ‖L1(Rd) and Γ(z) 
∫∞
0 s
z−1e−s ds is the Gamma
function.




i (cos, di). By Theorem 3.2,
there exist optimal strategies s◦i : Yi → Ai such that for j = 1, . . . , li, s◦i,j is of
class Cm−2 and has partial derivatives that are Lipschitz up to the order m − 2, so
s◦i,j ∈ Wm−1,∞(int(Yi)).
Since Yi is bounded, s
◦
i,j ∈ Wm−1,∞(int(Yi)) implies s◦i,j ∈ Wm−1,p(int(Yi)) for
every 1 ≤ p < ∞. As every Yi is a bounded convex set, by the Sobolev extension
theorem (see [51, Theorem 5, p. 181] and [51, Example 2, p. 189]), s◦i,j can then be
extended to a function s◦,ext,pi,j ∈ Wm−1,p(Rdi).
Let Y ′i  (yli,1, yui,1)× · · · × (yli,di , y
u
i,di
) ⊃ Yi and consider a function ψi ∈ C∞0 (Y ′i )
such that ψi(yi) = 1 for every yi ∈ Yi. By an application of [1, Theorem 3.22,
p. 68], s◦,′,pi,j  s
◦,ext,p




i ) if 1 ≤ p < ∞. By the Sobolev embedding
theorem [1, Theorem 4.12, p. 85], if di < p <∞, thenWm−1,p0 (Y ′i ) ⊂ Cm−2([yli,1, yui,1]×
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From now on, we assume di < p < ∞. Let {Ŝi,j,r1,...,rdi} be the set of the
coefficients of the Fourier series expansion of s◦,ext,pi,j on Y
′
i . Note that by construction,
the periodic extension of s◦,′,pi,j on R
di is of class Cm−2(Rdi). We apply a particular
case of an extension to multiple Fourier series [18, p. 647] of the Bernstein theorem





Thus, s◦,′,pi,j belongs to the closure (with respect to the L2(Y ′i )-norm) of the convex






∣∣∣ gi(yi) = b di∏
r=1
cos(ωi,ryi,r + θi,r),
|b| ≤ Ki,j, ωi,r =
2πh
yui,r − yli,r
, h ∈ N, θi,r ∈ [0, 2π)
}
.
Let Hi be the Hilbert space of functions fi : Yi → R such that Eyi{|fi(yi)|2} < ∞,
where the expected value is evaluated on Yi with the marginal probability density
function ρyi induced by ρ. As the probability density function ρ is bounded, s
◦
i,j
belongs to the closure (with respect to the norm of Hi) of the convex hull of the set
Gi,j(cos, di) 
{
gi : Yi → R
∣∣∣ gi(yi) = b di∏
r=1
cos(ωi,ryi,r + θi,r),
|b| ≤ Ki,j, ωi,r =
2πh
yui,r − yli,r
, h ∈ N, θi,r ∈ [0, 2π)
}
.(39)




Hence, by the Maurey–Jones–Barron theorem [5, Lemma 1, p. 934] (see also [21, 41]),
for every positive integer k ≥ 1 and every Ci,j > K2i,j−‖s◦i,j‖2Hi there exists a function
s̃
(k)
i,j in the convex hull of k elements of Gi,j(cos, di) such that
(40) ‖s◦i,j − s̃
(k)






We conclude the proof by taking projections on Ai,j and applying (40) and Theo-
rem 4.1.




i (σ, di). As in the proof of the first case, by choosing p =
2 the function s◦i,j can be extended to s
◦,ext,2
i,j ∈ Wm−1,2(Rdi). Let ŝ
◦,ext,2
i,j be its Fourier
transform. By similar arguments as in [5, Example 15, p. 941] (based on the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality), the condition m−1 > di/2+1 implies
∫
Rdi
|ŝ◦,ext,2i,j (ω)|‖ω‖2 dω <
+ ∞. So one can apply [5, Theorem 1] to s◦i,j on Yi, thus obtaining for sigmoidal
computational units the same approximation error bound as in (40), in general with
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different constants Ci,j . We conclude by taking projections onto Ai,j and applying
such a bound and Theorem 4.1.
(ii) As in the proof of item (i), by choosing p = 1 the function s◦i,j can be ex-
tended to s◦,ext,1i,j ∈ Wm−1,1(Rdi). As m − 1 is even, we can exploit the inclusion
of Sobolev spaces into Bessel potential spaces stated in [51, Remark 6.6 (b), p. 160].
Then, there exists λi,j ∈ L1(Rdi) such that s◦,ext,1i,j = Bm−1 ∗ λi,j . Since m − 1 > di
we can apply [15, Corollary 5.2], reported above as Theorem 7.1. This, together with
the fact that the L2-norm of a function defined on the bounded domain Yi can be
bounded from above by a constant times its sup-norm, provides for the case of Gaus-
sian computational units the same approximation error bound as in (40), in general
with different constants Ci,j . As before, we conclude the proof by taking projections
onto Ai,j and applying such an error bound and Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The statement follows by Theorems 3.2 and 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. The joint probability density function ρ(ξ, ζ, y1, y2) can
be written as




















This function is positive on [ξmin, ξmax]× [ζmin, ζmax] × Y1 × Y2 and for every m ≥ 2
enjoys the properties required in Assumption A1.
As the team utility function u has only linear and quadratic terms, Assumption
A2 is satisfied by taking τ  12 min{c11, c22} =
1
2 > 0.
Assumption A3 can be verified as follows (recall that intA1 denotes the topological
interior of A1). For every y1 ∈ Y1 and every admissible strategy s2, the function













is strictly concave and differentiable, and argmaxa1∈A1M1(y1, a1) ∈ intA1 iff for some






= Eξ|y1 {ξ} − c11a∗1 − c12Ey2|y1 {s2(y2)} = 0.




2− 0.15 · 10 = 0.5 ≤
Eξ|y1 {ξ} − c12Ey2|y1 {s2(y2)}
c11
≤ 10− 0.15 · 2 = 9.7
and [0.5, 9.7] ⊂ intA1. Similar arguments hold for every admissible strategy of the
other DM, so we conclude that Assumption A3 is satisfied.
Finally, Assumption A4 holds since the sets A1 and A2 are closed and bounded
nonempty intervals.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. The proof exploits the same arguments as those in the
proof of Proposition 5.2.
242 G. GNECCO, M. SANGUINETI, AND M. GAGGERO
REFERENCES
[1] R. A. Adams and J. J. F. Fournier, Sobolev Spaces, Academic Press, Amsterdam, 2003.
[2] H. Attouch, G. Buttazzo, and G. Michaille, Variational Analysis in Sobolev and BV
Spaces: Applications to PDEs and Optimization, SIAM, Philadephia, 2005.
[3] Y. Azrieli and E. Lehrer, The value of a stochastic information structure, Games Econom.
Behav., 63 (2008), pp. 679–693.
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